In 1959, the four largest political parties in Switzerland's Federal Assembly established a broad coalition government with a specific allocation of the seven cabinet seats among them. At that time, the assignment of seats corresponded roughly to the relative shares of votes of these parties. As a remarkable matter of fact, this assignment continued unaltered for 44 years. It is, therefore, phrased the 'Magic Formula'. We introduce a game of weighted voting for the Swiss government and compute the prenucleolus of this game over real-valued and integer-valued preimputation sets for all regular election periods from 1959 to date. It turns out that the Magic Formula is contained in most of the prenucleoli over integer domains between 1959 and 1999. The game solution likewise predicts in part a major modification of the Magic Formula adopted in 2003. Our results for the government elections in 1999, 2003, and 2007 suggest that the Green Party should also receive a cabinet seat, mainly in place of a seat of the Radical Free Democrats.
Introduction †
How should a given number of cabinet ministries be assigned to a committee of political parties? Which method for allocating the cabinet can be considered as being just? These are vital questions of parliamentary government. The underlying general issue is that of the distribution of representation among political constituencies [cf. Balinsky/Young (2001) ]. This problem has attracted a lot of theoretical interest, as can be seen, e.g., from the large volume of literature on the design of voting procedures [cf. the surveys by Brams (1994) , Brams/Fishburn (2002) , and Peleg (2002) ] and on the measurement of the resulting voting power in an electoral committee [cf. Owen (1995, Chapter 12) and Holler/Owen (2001) for an overview]. There, fair representation is often associated with the ideal of proportionality. In practice, nevertheless, many procedures for allocating cabinet seats tend to result in a governing coalition of parties which is either center-left or center-right, and often with a strong representation of small pivotal coalition members.
A notable and interesting exception, as we shall now see, is the process of government formation in Switzerland, a country with one of the longest democratic traditions in the world.
The Swiss Confederation has a bicameral national parliament. It comprises the larger House of Representatives or so-called National Council and the smaller Senate, the socalled Council of (cantonal) States. Every four years, at the beginning of the term of office of a newly elected National Council, the two chambers meet in joint session as the United Federal Assembly, in order to elect Switzerland's executive government, known as the Federal Council. Already instituted by the 1848 Federal Constitution, the Federal Council has seven members since. They are elected in separate balloting procedures. In the first two rounds of voting for a Council seat, each parliament member is free to enter a preferred name. Afterwards, the name that gained the least votes in the preceding round will be removed from the ballot. The election ends as soon as an absolute majority of votes is casted to one person. This person may later be re-elected for an indefinite number of four-year terms. When a Federal Councillor resigns from the office ahead of time, the parliament assembles again to fill the vacancy for the remainder of the term.
In 1959, the four largest political parties -in terms of votes in the Federal Assemblyestablished a broad coalition government with a specific distribution of the seven government seats among them: Two seats were assigned, respectively, to the liberal Radical Free Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic People's Party, and the Social Democratic † An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the Fourth Spain Italy Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory (SING 4) in Wroclaw (2008) .
Party, while one seat was given to the conservative Farmers' Party, which later became the Swiss People's Party. At that time, the allotments corresponded roughly to the relative shares of votes of these parties. As a remarkable matter of fact, the 1959 allocation of the Federal Council continued unaltered for 44 years. It is therefore referred to as Switzerland's 'Magic Formula'. In 2003, however, the Christian Democrats lost one government seat to the Swiss People's Party which had in the meantime grown to be the strongest party in the Federal Assembly. The revised formula was thereafter confirmed again most recently in 2007. Even so, the four governing parties never signed a written coalition agreement or joint political programme.
The Federal Council, when in session, acts as a collegial body and by majority accord, without explicit vote taking whenever possible in practice. The Councillors, then, are expected to support all Council decisions vis-à-vis the public, independent of their own conviction or that of their parties. To this effect, as a rule, Federal Councillors are not supposed to criticize one another in open court. In turn, almost all sitting Councillors ever since 1959 have been re-elected once, twice, or even three times, routinely in the first ballot, and often with more than 80 % up to around 90 % of the vote total. Councillors who decided to step down were replaced without trouble. In 1999, e.g., the two Christian Democrats in the Federal Council resigned from their offices before the end of term, each
Councillor after 12 years of service. It took the parliament four rounds of voting to fill the first seat, while six rounds were needed to fill the second. Nonetheless, in the respective two opening rounds, as much as 88 %, 99 %, and at two times even 100 % of the casted votes were already won by members of the Christian Democratic People's Party. These figures are evidence of a robust commitment to the Magic Formula throughout all parties represented in the parliament. The parties thus also seem to be largely engaged in bloc voting, although every party delegate votes without binding instructions.
The Magic Formula has greatly contributed to the political stability of Switzerland in the past, and thereby also to the country's economic performance. The Formula owes this success to the pursuit of 'concordance' in many areas of politics. The term is commonly used to describe a strong preference for cooperative conflict resolution, with a Rawlsian (1971) concern for minorities. 1 To put it in the words of the Preamble to the Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (1999): "We, the Swiss People and Cantons, ... know ... that the strength of a people is measured by the welfare of the weakest of its members". 1988, 2003) , Young (1994) ], such a constitutional declaration imposes a lexicographic welfare ordering for the society. We shall argue that this claim can be substantiated for the Federal Council. In particular, we show that the Magic Formula can be implemented by the prenucleolus of a weighted voting game, where the parties in the Federal Assembly are considered as the players. Our paper can thus be seen as an application of the theory of cooperative games to political science.
The following work is organized as follows: Our weighted voting game for the Swiss Federal Council will be developed in Section 2. There we also present our data set for 13 elections to the Federal Council between 1959 and 2007. Section 3 is devoted to the prenucleolus as a game-theoretical concept and to important properties of this concept which are relevant for our game. The game solution for real-valued and integer-valued preimputation sets is presented in Section 4. We shall see that the Federal Council is contained in most of the prenucleoli over integer domains between 1959 and 1999. We will also be able to capture, at least in part, the modification of the Magic Formula adopted in 2003. A particularly interesting aspect for the more recent years is that our game solution will also assign a government seat to the Green Party. Section 5 concludes with a summary and a brief outlook on the future prospects of the Magic Formula.
A Game of Voting for the Swiss Federal Council
To begin with, we define as N := {1, . . . , n} the finite set of all n political parties which are represented in the Swiss Federal Assembly after each full renewal of the National Council every four years, starting from the election period 1959. These parties will be interpreted as the players in the election of Switzerland's government, i.e. of the Federal Council. Their number n ranges from nine to fifteen. Each nonempty subset S of N is called a coalition, and no such coalition shall be excluded a priori for reasons of political ideology. 2 Every party or player i casts the w i > 0 single votes of the party's delegates in the parliament.
We always assume that all parliament members participate in an election. The vote total w := n i=1 w i thus amounts to either 240, 244, or 246, depending on the number of available parliament seats. 3 The respective quotas needed to elect a Council member can be calculated from q := w/2 + 1, which implements the absolute majority rule. We are thus given a game [q; w 1 , . . . , w n ] of weighted voting [cf. von Neumann/Morgenstern (1947, p. 431-433) ] to fill the seven Council seats.
2 Our concept of a coalition shall include N itself (the grand coalition of all parties) as well as every
3 This number was increased twice after 1959 in an adjustment to population growth and due to the creation of a new Federal State (Canton).
The empirical distribution of seats in the Federal Assembly over the 1959-2007 time period is provided in Table 1 . The seats of the four governing parties are listed with explicit party reference. We also explicitly report the number of seats of the Green Party which has become the next strongest party in the parliament. The remaining seats were won by various collections of other parties. These parties will be of minor importance in the game solution: 4 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 It is convenient to study the associated coalitional game Γ := (N, v) and its character-
A coalition S with v(S) = 7 is called a winning coalition. If v(S) = 0, coalition S is said to be losing. Whenever a winning coalition forms, it may freely decide how to share the worth v(S), i.e. how to allocate all government seats. By convention, v(∅) = 0 for the empty 'coalition'. The game is proper, since q > w/2, which means that there are no two disjoint winning coalitions of players who could then pass contradictory propositions:
We note that Γ belongs to the family of simple games [cf. von Neumann/Morgenstern (1947, Chapter 10), Shapley (1962) ], as the union S ∪ T of a winning coalition S and any disjoint coalition T always results in a winning coalition.
An outcome of the coalitional game Γ is an n-tuple x := (x 1 , . . . , x n ), where x i is the number of government seats assigned to party i. The problem then is to select at least one such outcome from the game's preimputation set, i.e. from the set of all feasible assignments of the seven government seats. This set will be real-valued, if a government seat can be shared by two or more players. The fractional part of x i will then be interpreted as one seat given to party i for the respective fractional part of a regular term of office. We are, in contrast, concerned with an integer allocation problem [cf. Young (1994, pp. 184-190) ], if the seats are by assumption indivisible. Both cases will be considered in more detail in the next sections. The appropriate preimputation set will be denoted as X 0 := {x ∈ R n ≥0 : i∈N x i = 7} and X 1 := {x ∈ Z n ≥0 : i∈N x i = 7}, respectively. 5 Elements of X 0 or X 1 will be called a payoff configuration or simply a payoff for the game Γ.
3 The Prenucleolus over X 0 and X
1
As we have argued earlier, the Swiss political paradigm of concordance is essentially egalitarian, with a Rawlsian (1971) focus on the least favored. The prenucleolus thus appears to be an appropriate solution concept for Γ. This section offers a more elaborate rationale for such a choice. We start with some notation and a formal definition.
Assume that an arbitrary payoff x has been proposed. We define the excess of coalition
off by standing alone instead of accepting x. Hence, each excess e(S, x) can be interpreted as a measure of discontent (or content, if negative) of coalition S when faced with proposal
x. Now associate with each payoff x the (complaint) vector Θ(x) of all 2 n − 2 excesses e(S, x), arranged in decreasing (or non-increasing) magnitude. Then, the prenucleolus N (Γ) is the set of all payoff configurations which are most acceptable in the sense that they minimize Θ(x) lexicographically over the set of admissible payoffs X: 6
5 We denote as R n ≥0 and, correspondingly, as Z n ≥0 , the n-dimensional Euclidean spaces of all nonnegative real numbers and of all nonnegative integers.
6 Excess vector Θ = (e1, . . . , e2n−2) is said to be lexicographically less than excess vectorΘ = (ẽ1, . . . ,ẽ2n−2), if there exists an index k such that ei =ẽi for all i < k and e k <ẽ k . We write Θ < lexΘ . If either Θ < lexΘ or Θ =Θ, then we write Θ ≤ lexΘ .
Definition 1. The prenucleolus of the game Γ with respect to the set X ∈ {X 0 , X 1 } is given by
It contains all payoffs x ∈ X for which Θ(x) is lexicographically least.
It can be shown that N (Γ, X) = ∅, since X 0 and X 1 are nonempty and compact sets.
Furthermore, as the set X 0 is also convex, N (Γ, X 0 ) will always consist of a unique payoff configuration, the so-called prenucleolus point of the game Γ. [Cf. Schmeidler (1969) . 7 ]
The leximin operator in (2) can be motivated intuitively by a scenario of egalitarian arbitration among coalitions of players. We quote from Maschler (1992, p. 611) :
Consider an arbitrator, whom the players ask to decide how to share v(N ) A less obvious, but desirable feature of N (Γ, X) over both domains X 0 and X 1 is that it reflects the strength of a party in the Federal Assembly. In particular, the order of the votes w 1 , . . . , w n of the parties will be weakly preserved. More precisely:
Proposition 1. Each payoff vector x in the prenucleolus N (Γ, X) of the game Γ with respect to X ∈ {X 0 , X 1 } satisfies:
(a) If X = X 0 and w i ≥ w j , then x i ≥ x j .
(b) If X = X 1 and w i ≥ w j , then x i ≥ x j − 1.
7 Schmeidler's original definition of the so-called nucleolus demands that v({i}) = 0 and, hence, xi ≥ v({i}) for all single players i. The latter inequalities ensure that the game solution is always individually rational. In our game, the prenucleolus and the nucleolus coincide, as no single player has enough votes to gain a majority on his own, i.e. there is no dictator.
Proof. Assume that there are two players i and j such that w i ≥ w j . Hence, by (1), v(S ∪ {i}) ≥ v(S ∪ {j}) for all coalitions S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. 8 To begin with, suppose that X = X 0 . Also suppose, per absurdum, that x ∈ N (Γ, X 0 ) with x i < x j . Consequently, e(S ∪ {i}, x) > e(S ∪ {j}, x) for all coalitions S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. Now take any coalition T ∈ arg max S⊆N \{i,j} e(S ∪ {j}, x) and define := e(T ∪ {i}, x) − e(T ∪ {j}, x) > 0.
Then consider a payoff transfer γ ∈ (0, /2] from player j to player i. This transfer reduces the excess of every coalition Q i,−j ∈ {S ⊆ N \{j} : i ∈ S} by γ, while the excess of each coalition Q j,−i ∈ {S ⊆ N \{i} : j ∈ S} increases by this amount. The excesses of all other coalitions stay constant. Since γ is small enough to maintain the order of the excesses of coalitions T ∪ {i} and T ∪ {j}, the resulting new vector of ordered excesses must be lexicographically less than Θ(x). Therefore, x cannot be an element of N (Γ, X 0 ), which proves part (a). If X = X 1 , then γ = 1 is the smallest possible transfer from player j to player i. It maintains the order of the excesses of coalitions T ∪ {i} and T ∪ {j} only if we had assumed, again per absurdum, that x ∈ N (Γ, X 1 ) and x i ≤ x j − 2. This confirms part (b).
An implication of Proposition 1 is that parties or players of the same type in terms of their votes in the Federal Assembly (cf. Table 1 ) are treated symmetrically, as we will now demonstrate. This means that they receive the same payoff, whenever possible. In the integer allocation problem, however, it may happen, e.g., that three seats in the Federal Council are to be divided between two identical players i and j. Symmetry then means that this results in a balanced allocation, i.e. the payoffs of the two players differ by at most one seat [Young (1994, p. 185) ]. In particular, if x ∈ N (Γ, X 1 ) and (x i , x j ) = (1, 2), thenx ∈ N (Γ, X 1 ) for the mirror image with (x i ,x j ) = (2, 1) andx k = x k for all k = i, j.
Hence, N (Γ, X 1 ) will be set-valued:
Corollary 1. Each payoff vector x in the prenucleolus N (Γ, X) of the game Γ with respect to X ∈ {X 0 , X 1 } satisfies:
(a) If X = X 0 and w i = w j , then x i = x j .
(b) If X = X 1 and w i = w j , then |x i − x j | ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. Since w i = w j by assumption, both inequalities w i ≥ w j and w j ≥ w i are met at the same time. If X = X 0 , it follows from Proposition 1a that x i ≥ x j and x j ≥ x i .
Therefore, x i = x j as claimed. If X 0 is replaced by X 1 , we conclude from Proposition 1b that x i ≥ x j − 1 and x j ≥ x i − 1, x i and x j being integers. Hence, |x i − x j | ∈ {0, 1}.
It remains to show that N (Γ, X) has a reduced-game property that is relevant to our application. This property is a special case of a property of independence of irrelevant alternatives:
of Y , every excess vector Θ(y) with y ∈ Y is lexicographically least over X. Hence, no smaller excess vector can be obtained by restricting the set of admissible payoffs to X .
Therefore, since also Y ⊆ X by definition of Y , we conclude that Y ⊆ N (Γ, X ) = ∅. Now suppose that there is an element x ∈ N (Γ, X ) which is not contained in Y . Then, Θ(x) = Θ(y) for each arbitrary y ∈ Y . Hence, x ∈ X and x ∈ N (Γ, X), which contradicts the assumption that x does not belong to Y . In all, N (Γ, X ) = Y .
Suppose that X is generated from X in that we take a nonempty coalition S ⊆ N of players and freeze the payoffs of the remaining players at x ∈ N (Γ, X). We are thus concerned with admissible payoffs x ∈ X such that x i = x i for all players i ∈ S. Now consider whichever nonempty coalition T ⊂ S and an arbitrary partner coalition R ⊆ N \S.
Then, e(T ∪ R,x) = v(T ∪ R) − i∈T x i − i∈R x i . 10 Note that v(T ∪ R) − i∈R x i does not depend on the payoffs x i , i ∈ S, while the deduction − i∈T x i is the same for all such T ∪ R, no matter which partner coalition R has been selected. An arbitrator would then want to deduct from max R⊆N \S {v(T ∪ R) − i∈R x i } as much as possible. We are thus given a hypothetical reduced game (S, v x S ) [cf. Davis/Maschler (1965) ], defined on a subset of players S at the payoff vector x, with characteristic function
An interpretation of (S, v x S ) is that the players in S examine their 'own' game, once the other players have accepted their payoffs in x. As these other players are still available for coalition formation, each nonempty subset of players in S would look for the best partner coalition R that it could possibly buy out at i∈R x i and claim the resulting net worth as in (3). 11 In our application, one might think of a Federal Council that is to be partly 9 A weaker requirement is the following: If X ⊆ X and ∅ = N (Γ, X) ⊆ X , then N (Γ, X ) = N (Γ, X).
This one applies, e.g., if N (Γ, X) is a singleton. Maschler/Potters/Tijs (1992, pp. 89-90) derive both versions of independence of irrelevant alternatives from a stronger property which they call contravariance.
10 By convention, i∈R xi = 0 if R = ∅.
renewed, like in 1999, when the two Christian Democrats in the Federal Council resigned ahead of time. According to Proposition 2, the payoffs of the players in the reduced game will not be redistributed then. This can be seen as an element of stability in the original game as well as indication of logical coherence of our solution concept. We may thus say that the resulting allocation of Council seats is consistent.
Results
An efficient numerical algorithm for the computation of the prenucleolus point of a weighted voting game over a real-valued preimputation set like X 0 has been proposed by Wolsey (1976) . We applied this algorithm to find N (Γ, X 0 ) for every full renewal of the Federal
Council from 1959 to date, given the information in Table 1 . All calculations have been performed in an extended-precision floating-point format that offers 18 significant digits.
A modern Personal Computer can perform such a task in less than a second of computing time per election period. Our (rounded) results are provided in Table 2. This table reports the numbers of seats that are allocated to each of the four governing parties and to the Green Party, as well as the seats assigned to the smaller parties classified as 'other': 12
We conclude from Table 2 Nonzero fractional parts of the numbers in Table 2 can be interpreted as a seat in the Federal Council that is assigned to a party only for the respective fractional part of 12 Small deviations of the column sums of Table 2 from seven, i.e. from the overall number of seats in the Federal Council, are due to rounding. 13 It can be shown for the year 1975 that the sets Wi := {S ⊆ N : v(S) = 7, i ∈ S} are of the same cardinality or size |Wi| = φ for each party i in the group of the seven smaller parties (including the Swiss People's party). Since φ is also relatively small, the parties' entries to N (Γ, X 0 ) come all out as zero. 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 Table 1 .
a regular term of office. At least one other party will then have to take over during the remainder of the term. We could argue that a Federal Councillor is, indeed, free to step down ahead of time. The vacant council seat could, thereby, also be transferred to another party. However, such a transfer during a normal term of function has never occurred in practice since 1959. It also does not appear to be in the spirit of the Swiss Constitution.
This can already be seen from the fact that the parliament has no power to dismiss a So we may want to find an integer allocation of the seven government seats that is as nearly proportional to N (Γ, X 0 ) as possible. E.g., we could simply round the entries in Table 2 to their nearest whole number. Alas, this so-called apportionment problem is surprisingly intricate. Simple rounding already fails for the first year 1959, as the total of the rounded seats amounts to six. More sophisticated 'rounding' procedures are (inevitably) biased in that they will favor either larger or smaller parties, which in turn may have unexpected or yet paradoxical consequences. 14 Even worse, no such procedure 14 The reader is referred to Young (1994, Chapter 3) and Brams/Kaplan (2004) for a discussion of is able to resolve a case where a remaining seat has to be distributed among two or more players with equal shares under N (Γ, X 0 ). This further difficulty is immediate for the year 1975. If two seats are assigned to the first three parties each, which party should receive the last seat?
Our way to circumvent the drawbacks of apportioning methods is to calculate the prenucleolus directly over the integer-valued domain X 1 , which then also provides an integer-valued game solution, this solution being N (Γ, X 1 ). As we are not aware of an algorithm that would allow us to compute N (Γ, X 1 ), we proceeded as follows. We first enumerated the sets X 1 of all non-negative integer allocations of the seven government seats to the respective 9, 10, ..., 15 parties in the Federal Assembly. For every election year then, we evaluated the vector of ordered excesses over the relevant set X 1 and collected those elements of X 1 for which this vector is lexicographically minimal, again based on the information in Table 1 . This can be done entirely in integer arithmetic. Given X 1 , a modern Personal Computer will need about a second up to less than four minutes of computing time to determine N (Γ, X 1 ), depending on the number of players. The results are listed in Table 3 . Numbers in italics indicate that the prenucleolus is set-valued.
In all such cases, the government seat of the Swiss People's Party (SPP) is successively re-assigned to players from a subgroup of the group of 'other' parties:
As a first remarkable result, Table 3 shows that the Magic Formula (2, 2, 2, 1, 0, . . . , 0) Thus, our game solution attributes more political weight to the green movement, as it is already the case in many other western countries.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to show that the theory of cooperative games can be applied successfully if we wish to study the allocation of cabinet seats in the highest executive authority of the Swiss Confederation, i.e. in the Federal Council. We started from the remarkable fact that there is a stable empirical assignment of the seven Council seats to the same broad coalition of four governing parties for 44 years since 1959 according to the so-called Magic Formula. We argued that the underlying political paradigm could possibly be captured by the prenucleolus of a weighted voting game for the Federal Council, with the political parties in Switzerland's Federal Assembly as the players. We verified that the prenucleolus would preserve the order of votes of the players. We also confirmed that a reduced-game property would be satisfied, which we interpreted as a sign of consistency of a game solution. Based on these theoretical considerations, we computed the prenuceolus 
